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The discovery of natural gas resources in the East 
Mediterranean promise important benefits of energy security 
and economic gains. A 2010 US geological survey showed 
that the Levantine basin - offshore Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, 
Syria and Cyprus - could hold as much as 120 trillion cubic 
feet, thus securing supply of energy not only for the 
countries of the region but also for Europe.  
As this paper will show, regional countries are currently at 
various stages of exploration and development which are 
however fraught by political risks and policy dilemmas. Thus 
cooperation, conflict resolution and the creation of 
interdependency structures are prerequisites to unlock the 
potential of the region and safeguard the unimpeded flow of 
future gas production.  
Israel as a Catalyst for Regional Energy Cooperation  
The gas discoveries have strengthened Israel’s energy 
security, and decidedly contribute to the reduction of Israel’s 
dependence on foreign energy. They also provide the 
promise of economic advantages given that natural gas  
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 supplies direct income to the state treasury as a result of 
royalties and taxes paid by gas suppliers.  
Israel is a leading country for regional energy cooperation 
because the preparations to extract gas from its major fields, 
Leviathan and Tamar, are already at advanced stages. For 
the record, Tamar was the largest deepwater natural gas 
discovery in the world in 2009 and sales from the field began 
in 2013, just only four years from discovery. Leviathan was 
discovered in December 2010 and represents the largest 
exploration success, with gross mean resources of 22 Tcf of 
natural gas2.  
Following Israel’s High Court of Justice approval of a 
government decision to export 40 percent of the country’s 
offshore gas discoveries, Israel looks into a combination of 
export options on the basis that gas is a game changer 
stressing the inevitability between macroeconomics and 
geopolitics. It is in this context, that priority is given to Jordan 
as disruptions of energy imports from Egypt have impacted 
the Kingdom’s public budget and fiscal space for broader 
development goals. The sale of Israeli gas to Jordan falls 
within Amman’s broad strategy for transformational change 
in energy supply, including a diversification of natural gas 
imports from alternative sources in the region. 
Noble Energy, a heavy foreign investor in Israel’s fields, has 
signed a contract worth $500 million to supply 66 billion 
cubic feet of gas from Israel’s Tamar field to Jordan’s Arab 
Potash and its affiliate Jordan Bromine. Leviathan partners 
Noble and Delek have also signed a non-binding letter of 
intent with Jordan’s National Power Electric, which will act as 
buyer of the gas, to supply 1.6tn cubic feet over a fifteen-
year period3. Other investigated projects focus on the 
construction of a 25-kilometer pipeline that would connect 
northern Israel to northern Jordan, facilitating the supply of 
natural gas to major Jordanian manufacturing plants.  
It is acknowledged that infrastructure partnerships between 
Israel and Jordan can provide real incentives to normalize 
relations, given that the supply of cheap and reliable energy 
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 will bolster the kingdom’s economy and that Leviathan 
partners’ export earnings will increase.  
Figure 1: Israel’s export options 
An additional option for the monetization of Israeli gas 
centers on Egypt, which suffers from domestic gas 
shortages due to export obligations and a growing 
population. Cairo’s political instability, heavy regulations, and 
ceiling on onshore prices have transformed over the years 
the Arab country from a gas exporter into a heavy energy 
importer. Although Egypt’s total proven reserves are 
approximately 2.2 trillion cubic meters, its production levels 
and reserves have not improved despite technological 
breakthroughs and massive capital expenditures, leaving 
two major LNG facilities in Damietta and Idku virtually idle. 
For this reason, Israel’s energy policy vis-a-vis Egypt has a 
dual dimension; on the one side, it centers on the sale of gas 




































 looks into using Egypt’s LNG facilities as export terminals to 
reach markets like Europe and Asia. 
Thus, pipelines from Israel’s gas reserves to Egypt for 
liquefaction and re-export has become a real choice, taking 
into account the close distance between the Egyptian and 
Israeli coasts. The option for the transport of Israeli gas to 
Egypt is either through reversing the flow in the Egyptian 
export pipeline that crosses Sinai or the construction of a 
new undersea pipeline and it is esteemed as viable not only 
because of the royalties and revenues Israel will collect but 
also because of the potential positive impact on Egypt-Israel 
bilateral relations. 
Already, partners of Israel’s Tamar field have signed a non-
binding letter of intent to export up to 2.5 trillion cubic feet of 
gas over 15 years via the Damietta LNG plant in Egypt 
operated by Union Fenosa Gas, a joint venture between 
Spain’s Gas Natural and Italy’s ENI.4 Similarly, Leviathan 
partners reached a preliminary agreement with British Gas 
(BG), a British oil and gas company, to negotiate a deal to 
export gas to BG’s liquefied natural gas plant in Idku 
(northern Egypt) via a new undersea pipeline.  
To move one step further, the recent decision of the Israeli 
energy ministry to grant its first formal approval for the 
export of gas from the Tamar field to Egypt's Dolphinus 
Holdings, while still hinging on regulatory and other 
bureaucratic approvals, paves the way for regional 
cooperation in the gas sector that can eventually include 
countries like Jordan and Cyprus. Notably however, gas 
import talks have ceased due to the recent rule of the 
International Chamber of Commerce according to which 
Egypt must compensate with 2 billion dollars Israel for the 
repeated halting of gas supplies via the El-Arish-Ashkelon 
pipeline. According to energy officials, it is important for talks 
to restart on the precondition that both countries agree on 
compensation reduction or even complete compensation 
elimination in lieu of an import agreement with Israel that will 
definitely revive the Israeli gas export infrastructure.  
Another export option to immediate neighbors includes a 
subsea pipeline from Israel’s Leviathan field to Turkey, but 
this is currently considered politically non-viable. There is 
widespread consensus in Israel that without a political 
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 reconciliation between the two countries, any advancement 
of an export agreement remains remote. Specifically, even 
though the project is tempting to private companies because 
the construction of the 480 kilometer pipeline would be 
cheap5, Israel appears cautious in entrusting its most 
precious resource to Islamic Turkey because of the 
likelihood that the Turkish leadership waves the card of gas 
in the face of Israel in times of political crises thus rendering 
Israel hostage to Turkey.   
Reservations are also expressed regarding financial security 
in any future framework energy agreement between Israel 
and Turkey, with suggestions centering on that financial 
security can be provided by a third party such as the U.S. 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the U.S. Export-
Import Bank, or the German Euler Hermes company.  
When it comes to the Israel-Palestine front, discussions 
revolve around the Palestinian control of the West Bank’s 
energy industry with the enforcement of a deal signed 
between Leviathan partners and the Palestine Power 
Generation Company, which foresees the purchase of $1.2 
billion worth of Israeli natural gas over a 20-year period.6 For 
the gas to be shipped to the Palestinian power plant in 
Jenin, which will permit Palestinians to produce their own 
electricity and create jobs in the West Bank, construction of 
a 10-kilometer gas pipeline from Northern Israel has to 
materialize. But it is still pending because of lack of political 
will.  
A Note on Israel’s Anti-trust Challenge 
The regulatory uncertainty in Israel has stalled the 
development of the Leviathan field and thrown into limbo gas 
export agreements with Jordan and Egypt since December 
2014 when the Israeli Anti-trust Authority commissioner 
issued a recommendation for investing companies to divest 
from the Tamar and Leviathan fields.7 The reason is that the 
Israeli regulatory framework foresees the establishment of a 
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 competitive gas market and upon this the anti-trust 
commissioner has the authority to block any trade 
agreement perceived as violating competition laws.  
In an effort to overcome regulatory obstacles and reignite a 
number of preliminary agreements to export Israeli gas to 
Jordan and Egypt, the Israeli government approved a 
revised gas agreement in August 2015 with the partners of 
Tamar and Leviathan fields.8 The revised gas agreement 
has aimed to manage the speedy development of the gas 
fields and create competition, setting aside anti-trust 
regulations and conflicting state decisions on issues, such 
as taxation and prices. 
Under the agreement terms, in a frame of six years, Israel’s 
Delek group will sell its holdings in the Tamar, Tanin and 
Karish fields, and US Noble Energy will reduce its holdings 
in Tamar to no more than 25 percent. In addition, the 
agreement contains a “stability” clause that binds the 
government for the next fifteen years to unchanged 
regulations pertaining to the structural and financial facets of 
the Israeli gas industry. The agreement also foresees the 
implementation of a deal to export gas from Tamar field to 
the Egyptian liquefaction plant of Idku for re-export to 
Europe, and the introduction of a timetable for the 
development of the Leviathan field by 2019 with Noble 
Energy’s and Delek Group’s commitment to invest $1.5 
billion over the next two years. 
The Israeli Supreme Court’s March 27, 2016 decision that 
the parliamentary approved framework gas deal struck 
between the government and Noble/Delek partners in 
Israel’s Leviathan field is illegal on the basis that its central 
piece, the stability clause, is unconstitutional has shaken up 
Israel’s energy sector.9 The reason is that if investing 
companies are forced to disengage, the possibility of 
developing Leviathan will be jeopardized for the coming 
years. Equal important, the resulting delays in progress on 
proposed supply projects between Israel and neighboring 
countries can damage the former's standing and credibility 
as a reliable supplier of gas resources. Thus, there is urgent 
need for a policy solution based on considerations that Israel 
cannot have a truly competitive market as there are two 
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 main fields and one meaningful buyer, which is the Israeli 
Electric Corporation. Practically, a policy solution can satisfy 
the terms of Israel’s anti-trust legislation which allows 
exemptions from limitations when a sector is viewed to have 
a natural monopoly. 
By all means, regulatory stability is deemed significant for 
investors who currently stand on a fine line between staying 
or leaving the Israeli energy market, and eye benefits and 
risks in the post-sanctions Iranian opening of a large gas 
sector. 
Cyprus Changes Tides for Natural Gas  
Another significant player for regional energy cooperation is 
Cyprus given that gas discoveries can turn the island into a 
net natural gas exporter. The recent declaration of 
commerciality for the Aphrodite gas field by its partners 
confirms the existence of substantial recoverable natural gas 
reserves in Block 12 of Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ).10 Commerciality of Aphrodite field presents a 
milestone to Cyprus’ transition from the stage of 
hydrocarbons exploration to that of exploitation, and a 
significant step towards the monetization of the island’s 
indigenous natural gas reserves, both for domestic use as 
well as exports. 
Cyprus has already signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Egypt on gas cooperation for the 
downstream exploitation of output from the Aphrodite field by 
utilizing gas infrastructure existing in the Arab country via a 
direct subsea pipeline. Additionally, the inauguration of a 
tripartite partnership between Cyprus, Egypt and Greece 
with the signing of the Cairo declaration in November 2014 
falls on maritime security and energy cooperation, and is 
currently reinforced by high level political and technical 
meetings.11 The Greek dimension in the partnership is 
important because of Greece’s strategic location at the 
crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa that can cuddle 
Cyprus-Egypt as well as Israel energy cooperation by linking 
gas pipelines away from war risk zones. 
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Figure 2: Offshore Cyprus hydrocarbons exploration blocks 
In monetizing natural gas resources, Cyprus also needs to 
face a prime challenge associated with one of the multiple 
regional export options that are on the table, which is the 
pipeline project that would connect Israel’s Leviathan field to 
the Turkish coast. For the Cypriot side, the prerequisite to 
this export option is the resolution of the Cyprus conflict 
since the pipeline would have to cross Cyprus’s EEZ. There 
is growing consent that the natural gas discoveries in Cyprus 
could prove a catalyst for a breakthrough in the strategic 
impasse over the island, which is still divided between 
Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities.  
It is in any case noticeable that a vote of confidence related 
to the island’s regional energy standing is conceded by 
major oilfield services companies, such as Halliburton and 
Schlumberger that have based operations for the East 
Mediterranean in Cyprus.12  
12 Elias Hazou, “Oilfield Services Leaders to Set Up Regional Base in Cyprus”, 





































 No doubt that Cyprus’s natural gas discoveries present a 
game changer that poses all kinds of risks and opportunities 
for the island’s economic recovery and growth. It is in this 
context that policies need to center on the creation of a 
Cypriot sovereign wealth fund, preferably based on the 
Norwegian model, to recycle revenues, and the 
establishment of a regional sponsor-supported non-
governmental organization or council that would include 
energy companies, energy industry service providers, 
energy industry associations, and other related stakeholders 
in the region. Once established, the council could seek 
government participation from the littoral states of the 
Eastern Mediterranean. It could then become a point of 
reference and also an avenue of communication between 
governments and industry, as well as a clearinghouse for 
ideas and plans for mutually beneficial energy development 
in the region.  
Greece’s Challenge for Exploration and Production: What Lies Ahead 
Development of Greece’s energy reserves will likely be 
further delayed unless key challenges are addressed. These 
challenges include domestic political instability, the high cost 
of exploration and drilling, the prolongation of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitation problems with 
neighboring Turkey, and cheap electricity prices imposed by 
the state-monopoly of the Public Power Corporation. 
It is important to highlight the value of Greece as a transit 
country for regional gas supplies to Europe, especially given 
the lengthy process of exploration and development of major 
energy projects that are expected to increase economic 
growth, job creation and competitiveness. The Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP) route for example will run through 13 
provinces in Northern Greece and is expected to create 
10,000 direct and indirect jobs, even though approval was 
delayed to mid-January 2016 due to objections from 
environmental groups and local communities.13 Despite the 
belief that oil and gas exploration and production (E&P) 
could help mediate the economic crisis, the Greek 
government has proceeded with only three concessions, 
delaying the approval of licenses and permits. Specifically, 
bids for the onshore licensing round of areas in Southern 
and Western Greece are currently under evaluation, as is 
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 the second international licensing round, whose deadline 
expired in July 2014. Prerequisites for attracting international 
companies in Greek gas E&P include resolving the Greek 
political decision-making standoff; the approval of a new 
regulatory framework for the gas sector; and the 
appointment of specialized personnel at the Greek 
Hydrocarbon Management Company (EDEY) to speed 
tender procedures.  
 
Figure 3: Exploration blocks along Western and Southern 
Greece 
Energean Oil and Gas company, Greece’s only hydrocarbon 
producer, has initiated a $200 million investment plan for 





































 barrels per day by the end of 2017.14 This is a significant 
increase from today’s 3,000 at the Prinos basin in the north 
Aegean Sea. In the context of Israel-Cyprus-Greece 
synergies, Energean considers Israel a key country and 
thereby has taken the decision to commit to offshore Israel 
through the joint Ocean/Energean deep-sea operator even if 
that means that the Greek company will be excluded from 
Iran. 
The Security of Mediterranean Oil and Gas Infrastructure  
Security needs to be prioritized in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Terrorism, human trafficking, and illegal 
migration pose major threats to the security of the oil and 
gas industry and thus require a collective regional response. 
A thorough examination of effective security measures finds 
that the Australian experience could be an efficient guide for 
the East Mediterranean. Australia is the world’s ninth largest 
energy producer, accounting for around 2.4 percent of world 
energy production, generating $28 billion in revenue 
annually, and contributing 58 percent of the country’s 
primary energy needs.15 Australia’s experience has been 
utilized to improve the security framework of the oil and gas 
infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Assessments indicate that terrorist threats to offshore 
infrastructure could emanate from home-grown or 
internationally driven terrorist operations.16 Thus 
consideration has to be given both to extending and 
hardening current security exclusion zone boundaries and to 
increasing the safety and security of offshore facilities from 
unlawful or unauthorized intrusion and threat. 
Recommendations focus on the introduction of a three-tiered 
approach to security zoning for all offshore facilities: 1) a 
cautionary zone of 15 nautical miles; 2) an area to be 
avoided of 5 nautical miles; and 3) an exclusion zone 
                     
14 Reuters, “Greek Fledgling Oil Sector Steps Up Production”, January 7, 2016. 
Accessed at: 
http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL8N14R2FD20160107  
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Repeal Bill 2014; Second Reading. Accessed at: 
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16 Assaf Harel, ‘Preventing Terrorist Attacks on Offshore Platforms: Do States 
Have Sufficient Legal Tools?’, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 4, 


































 between 1 and 2.5 nautical miles, with approval to enter 
granted only by the facilities’ operator.17  
Figure 4: Security zoning for offshore oil and gas facilities 
Physical Threats to East Mediterranean Energy Supply have to be 
approached in terms of: 
  Pipeline security: 
Most oil and natural gas pipelines run above-ground and 
extend over hundreds of miles, making them highly visible 
and difficult to protect. Pipelines are prime symbolic targets, 
seen as representing foreign influence & economic or 
political inequality. 
For example, politically motivated groups have attacked oil 
pipelines in Colombia and Nigeria, while since 2011 Arish 
17 Mikhail Kashubsky and Anthony Morrison, Security of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Facilities: Exclusion Zones and Ships’ Routeing, Australian Journal of 





































 Askelon gas pipeline from Egypt to Israel and Jordan has 
been repeatedly blowed up. 
In terms of: 
Maritime Security:  
Oil and LNG tankers are slow moving and rarely well-
defended. Offshore platforms and ports are vulnerable. 
Global shipping lanes pass through narrow channels known 
as chokepoints could be targets (such as the Strait of 
Hormuz and the Bosporus Straits). Attack on, or interdiction 
of, a vessel in chokepoints could result in closures or limits 
on traffic, and thus would seriously impact world energy 
supply. 
Evidently, the Mediterranean oil and gas fields must be 
protected by a combination of local state security forces and 
company operators’ private security forces. So regional 
countries like Israel, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Jordan, Turkey 
and others could partner to analyze risks and find solutions 
based either on prevention and detection or response and 
recovery.  
Conclusion 
No doubt that the East Mediterranean gas discoveries 
provide a golden opportunity for energy security and 
cooperation, an opportunity that must not be neglected 
because as it is aptly highlighted in a famous Arabian 
proverb “three things come not back; the spoken word, the 
sped arrow, and the neglected opportunity”. It is in this spirit 
that regional countries coordinate policies and share best 
practices so that the opportunity is not neglected. 
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